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Insofar as theology is responsible to its religious sources, it seeks to answer religious
questions, such as, for Christians, "What must I do to be saved?" However, theology also
involves asking whether such a question is the right one at all. This essay attempts an
innovative approach to this question by investigating the intelligibility of "the soul." Much
recent neurobiology suggests that, even ifa defensible notion of soul can be presented, it is
unclear that it would allow meaningful talk about salvation.
Introduction: the question
concerning salvation
It" there is something about human be-
ings that is saveable, what is it? What makes
it saveable? This "something" has been vari-
ously named; here it will be called psyche,
or soul. Such radical questions are theologi-
cally vital today, because certain neurosci-
entific research suggests that, even if a de-
fensible notion of soul can be presented, it
is not clear that the notion would have any
content allowing meaningful talk about "sal-
vation." In light of this, this essay attempts
an encounter between seemingly quite un-
compromising positions: in neuroscience,
eliminative materialism; and in theology.
Eastern Orthodoxy. Through this test case,
certain "limit conditions" of exchange be-
tween theology and neuroscience may be-
come apparent. 1
Theology as "interested observation"
Theology, 2 like any inquiry, is partial to
its own interests. When theologians describe
human being, they work with terms that help
them to understand religion with relevance
to theos, God—for example: soul. mind,
choice, conscience. This terminology is not
self-fulfilling prophecy, though. As the "new
physics" of the twentieth century has
evinced, observation is never uninterested:
objects of inquiry appear different, accord-
ing to different methods of inquiry. In this
sense, theologians have a priori commit-
ments regarding which terms best make
sense of human being, and they rightly re-
quire convincing of the need to let go their
commitments.
Yet, theology, like every other inquiry,
ought to be conducted with interests that are
"pure." So. for instance, theologians, taken
as a community of disciplined inquirers seek-
ing rational understanding of religion with
respect to God. are normally adamant that
they do not merely invent the objects that
they study—that is. that their terms refer to
things, situations, relations that are not
merely linguistic. If "the soul" is a referent
within theological language, then an under-
lying expectation is that the soul is a reality
in a world in which it is referable, and that it
is positively usable in other discourses, too.
The minimal affirmation is that the soul have
a public "persona."
W. Mark Richardson has enumerated a
set of theological interests relevant to inquiry
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into the soul. They constitute "a recogniz-
able core understanding of human agency
. . . [that is] inalienably wedded to what is fre-
quently called commonsense psychology." 3
Commonsense psychology (CSP, also fre-
quently called "'Folk Psychology") holds that
terms such as those that theologians use re-
fer to real features of human being. CSP
trusts first-person reportage as an accurate
indicator of the reality of a first person, an
"1." as such. However, the accomplishments
of neuroscience in this century have contrib-
uted to a fragmentation of a shared horizon
that helped to validate commonsense psy-
chology. One problem for a present-day
theologian seeking to pose the question con-
cerning salvation, then, is that neuroscientifie
pictures of human being equivocate on the
reality-status of the referents of CSP com-
mitments. For example, the picture projected
by eliminative materialism (EM), a
neuroscientifie hypothesis which rejects CSP
outright in favor of experimental neurobiol-
ogy, may imply that any theological claim
about human being is meaningless, inasmuch
as it is "inalienably wedded" to CSP. Still,
theologians who intend to maintain the pub-
Neither is the soul a body-part: it is
difficult to fixfor examination because
that would annihilate the object of
study, which is not merely a body but
animated human being.
lie reality of the soul should be willing to
submit their claims alongside those of EM.
As previously noted, to affirm such a degree
of publicity does not imply that theological
inquiry is disinterested observation; but nei-
ther should an honest test of theological
claims begin by preferring a "purely" non-
theological account as the norm by which to
measure them. Such a maneuver, if possible,
would be both unfitting and irresponsible to
the engendering religious situation in which
the question concerning salvation arises
—
a falsely humble "cultural cringe" before sci-
entific hegemony.
The mythic horizon of theological
psyche-logy
An integrative "psyche-logy," respon-
sive to neuroscience without ceding theo-
logical interest, is imaginable. In the first
place, treated as a formal term, the "soul"
symbolizes the defining aspect(s) of human
being with respect to God, without neces-
sarily specifying its character. That the soul
has been important to theology in the past
and less esteemed in neurobiology is not an
essential characteristic of this symbol: per-
haps the biochemical activity of the brain is
the most religiously significant aspect of hu-
man being. 4 Secondly, whether from inher-
ited dogmatic prejudices or from experience
of human behavior, theologians have tended
to image the soul as in need of salvation.
Indeed, it is an image of the fundamental
condition of human being (though less fun-
damental for current neuroscience). 5 Thirdly,
the soul perhaps is not present to empirical
analysis in the way the
brain is. Theological inter-
est in the soul involves a
mythic framework. Even if
neurobiological inquiry
found the "same" soul in the
"same" predicament, neuro-
' biological modes of dis-
course are sufficiently dif-
ferent from theological
modes that it would not be
apparent that the same things had registered
without an involved hermeneutical meta-in-
quiry.
Myth is discourse that images what is
most valuable but least graspable about re-
ality, and it does so indirectly and poetically/'
It is a way of world-making. Within this
horizon, one can call theological psyche-
logy, without disparagement, a "soul-search-
ing." However, myth is not the only hori-
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zon for theology and, therefore, does not pre-
clude engagement with the sciences. It is a
proper theological task to inquire after the
truth of the symbol of the soul. Thus, theol-
ogy may be interested in science in overlap-
ping ways. With respect to truth, does the
CSP specification of the soul correspond to
something real? Is it verifiable at least some-
what independently of religious and theo-
logical assertion? Is theology absolutely
committed to CSP? With respect to the in-
strumental side of the question of salvation,
if there is a soul, is it saveable, and how?
Clearly, a serious engagement between the-
ology and science necessitates sensitive
checking and cross-checking. It is a herme-
neutical engagement, not a wholesale demy-
thologization or "operationalization" ofthe-
ology for the sake of science (the cultural
cringe). Myth refers to the empirical world,
not as that world's superficial embellish-
ment, but inasmuch as poiesis assumes ma-
terials with which to create, 7 Christian myth
images this by underscoring the contingency
of salvation upon actualizing choices. 8 From
a theological perspective, then, one may con-
clude that the soul of human being is respon-
sible being, that is, being required to choose.
1
'
Thus, the most important theological inter-
est in a dialogue with neurobiology is to test
whether the notions of choice and responsi-
bility are intelligible in the biological con-
text.
Toward integration
/. Scientific psychologies
With the rising success of scientific-
methods in explaining natural events in the
human environment, ambitions grew to un-
derstand through explanation what human
beings are in themselves. In pan, these am-
bitions rode tandem with rejection of eccle-
siastical power in society. Church power
depended, some argued, on a rhetoric of an
immortal soul whose everlasting fate lay in
the care of the Church. But that soul was an
occult notion that did not explain anything-
unless the irrational subjugation of masses
of people to Church power. So, a vicious
ecclesial circle. 1 "
This historical current stimulated at-
tempts to explain the soul more scientifically,
including modern psychoanalysis, behavior-
ism, and neurobiology. Yet, differences
among these sciences are strong. For in-
stance, some neurobiologists take a stand
against psychoanalysis and other forms of
CSP. arguing that these are no less occult
then religious authority. Advocates of EM
(that stand in its strongest form) expect to
do away with any talk of psyche. Paul M.
Churchland states:
Eliminative materialism is the thesis
that our common-sense perception
of psychological phenomena consti-
tutes a radically false theory, a
theory so fundamentally defective
that both the principles and the
ontology oi' that theory will even-
tually be displaced, rather than
smoothly reduced, by completed
neuroscience. Our mutual under-
standing and even our introspection
may then be reconstituted within the
conceptual framework of completed
neuroscience, a theory we may ex-
pect to be more powerful by far than
the common-sense psychology it
displaces, and more substantially
integrated within physical science
generally."
Churchland 's thesis has merit: after all,
no psychoanalyst has ever seen an id; but
his complaint is akin to cosmonaut Yuri
Gagarin's boast that he did not see God w hile
he orbited the earth. Gagarin mistakenly
supposed that all theologians think God is
an entity in and of the cosmos. Neither is
the soul a body-part: it is difficult to fix for
examination because that would annihilate
the object of study, which is not merely a
body but animated 12 human being. Among
scientific psychologists, this is treated as an
aspect of the so-called mind-body problem.
EM is one of several non-dualistic, physi-
calist approaches to resolving the difficulty. 13
To be true to EM, though, we should
not consider it any kind of modern psychol-
ogy. For its advocates, it is the way of the
future: "completed" neuroscience will not
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bring about any reduction of mental events
to physical events, but will supersede the un-
wieldy and false language of mentality and
psyche. The notion of "completed neuro-
science" is only one of a variety of refer-
ences to the anticipated success of EM.
The rejection of CSP works in the fol-
lowing way. Advocates of EM argue that
CSP constitutes an empirical theory of hu-
man being. This is in contrast to other views,
which either take CSP to be a normative
theory,—that is, a representation of how a
properly functioning human being (one
whose being is in a state of well-being)"
would understand him/herself—or do not
consider it a theory at all but simply the re-
flective gleaning of the kinds of states, atti-
tudes, decisions, beliefs, etc., that are the
content of mental events.
If CSP is an empirical theory, then it
may be tested in the following ways: first,
for a theory truly to account for the phenom-
ena to which it refers, it must demonstrate
explanatory and predictive success. Paul
Churchland acknowledges that CSP stands
up reasonably well under this test.' 4 For
example, if I see some-
one having a drink of
water, I can hypoth-
esize that the reason is
that they feel thirsty
with a usual confirma-
tion of my hypothesis
.
The feeling of thirst
thus becomes an effec-
tive explanation for the
observed behavior of
drinking water, and not
only for one experimental subject but for
many. However, the extent and importance
of CSP's failures should also be recognized.
On this score, Churchland especially empha-
sizes an inability to generate knowledge
about learning processes. 13 Relevant here is
a second test of a theory's truth, the extent
of "its coherence and continuity with fertile
and well-established theories in adjacent and
overlapping domains."
If we approach homo sapiens from
the perspective of natural history
and the physical sciences, we can
tell a coherent story of his constitu-
tion, development, and behavioral
capacities which encompasses
particle physics, atomic and
molecular theory, organic chemistry,
evolutionary theory, biology,
physiology, and materialistic
neuroscience. That story, though
still radically incomplete, is already
extremely powerful, outperform-
ing... [CSP| at many points even in
its own domain. And it is deliber-
ately and self-consciously coherent
with the rest of our developing
world picture. In short, the greatest
theoretical synthesis in the history of
the human race is currently in our
hands, and pails of it already provide
searching descriptions and explana-
tions of human sensory input, neural
activity, and motor control.
But... [CSP) is no part of this
growing synthesis. 16
Making allowance for his penchant for ba-
thos. Churchland does have a significant
claim against CSP here. At the same time,
Churchland's seemingly unintentional allu-
sion to CSP's "own domain" is a notewor-
thy concession. The idea of a domain re-
That the soul has been important to theol-
ogy in the past and less esteemed in neuro-
biology is not an essential characteristic of
this symbol: perhaps the biochemical activ-
ity of the brain is the most religiously sig-
nificant aspect ofhuman being.
fleets this essay's terminology of horizons
and resolutions.
A claim for the virtues of EM is made
at length by Patricia Smith Churchland.
Briefly, the EM resolution of the mind-brain
problem is entirely in terms of the structure
and biochemical activity of the brain and ner-
vous system. This establishes relations of
continuity between humans and other ani-
mals, since "neurons and their modus oper-
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andi are essentially the same in all nervous
systems—our neurons and the neurons of
slugs, worms, and spiders share a fundamen-
tal similarity." 17 That similarity has been
key to research programs of EM, since the
same activities that are masked by so much
complexity in human beings can be studied
in environments of relatively simple organi-
zation. Although EM refuses the language
of CSP, it does not affect to simplify human
beings. From the level of basic cellular form
and function. Smith Churchland builds up a
picture of the increasing complexity and
interactivity of structural organization and
biochemical processes, and develops ac-
counts of behavior, without resort to language
of agency, responsibility, freedom, or choice.
The challenge posed to theological descrip-
tion of human being by EM in its construc-
tive program is just the adequacy of its ac-
counts of human behavior, which prescind
from introduction of CSP concepts. How-
ever, criticisms have been leveled against EM
from several quarters.
Several criticisms may be made of the
Churchlands' position. First, and in good
CSP fashion, it may be suggested that "'there
are more things in heaven and earth than are
dreamt of in your neuro-philosophies." Ad-
mittedly, such a claim has counted against
CSP and in favor of EM. Where advocates
of CSP had perhaps assumed that there could
be no reduction of mental to physical, in fact
neurobiologists have made extraordinary lev-
els of knowledge available about the bio-
chemical goings-on of human beings. Both
Churchland and Smith Churchland are ada-
mant about taking a naturalist stance. The
question is, why do they restrict the charac-
ter of nature to what current physical sciences,
perhaps slightly extended, can make known?
A second criticism is leveled at the
construal of CSP as an empirical theory that
involves defining the content of CSP as a set
of regulative propositions. Since observa-
tions of human behavior showed that these
propositions were not obeyed, CSP must be
taken to be a false theory. John Searle ques-
tions whether CSP is an empirical theory in
quite the way advocates ofEM pose it. "Con-
sciousness has an ineliminable subjective
ontology," he writes. 1S The "postulates" of
CSP are not postulates at all; they are expe-
riences and therefore exhibit subjectivity:
[W]e do not postulate beliefs and
desires to account for anything. We
simply experience conscious beliefs
and desires. Think about real-life
examples. It is a hot day and you
are driving a pickup truck in the
desert outside of Phoenix. No air
conditioning. You can't remember
when you were so thirsty, and you
want a cold beer so bad you could
scream. Now where is the "postula-
tion" of a desire?
,l)
A third and related criticism is that EM is
a theory that, for all its pretensions to monism,
is really just a half a dualism. Searle again:
Now why are they [materialists] so
anxious to deny the existence of
irreducible intrinsic mental phenom-
ena? Why don't they just concede
that these properties are ordinary
higher-level biological properties of
neurophysiological systems such as
human brains?
...|A)t least part of the answer
has to do with the fact that they
accept the traditional Cartesian
categories, and along with these
categories the attendant vocabulary
with its implications. I think from
this point of view to grant the exis-
tence and irreducibility of mental
phenomena would be equivalent to
granting some kind of Cartesian-
ism.... What I want to insist on.
ceaselessly, is that one can accept
the obvious facts of physics—for
example, that the world is made up
of physical particles in fields of
force—without at the same time
denying the obvious facts about our
own experiences-for example, that
we are all conscious and that our
conscious states have quite specific
irreducible phenomenological prop-
erties. The mistake is to suppose
that these two theses are inconsis-
tent, and that mistake derives from
accepting the traditional vocabulary. :n
Three further criticisms can be made.
First, Churchland 's focus on defining CSP
in terms of propositional attitudes flattens
language to a mere projective function.21 But
human beings also "do things with words."
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The poetic indirection of myth bears this out.
Linguistic action, just as one example of hu-
man activity, is accomplished very differ-
ently from the way in which biochemical
processes occur. Secondly, Churchland tests
CSP according to criteria of predictive suc-
cess and coherence with other theories, but
not according to criteria of representational
correspondence to reality. Hence, there is
no obligation upon him, as there is upon most
theologians, to "save the appearances."
Churchland's freedom here, unlike the free-
dom postulated by integrative theologians,
seems sheerly arbitrary. And finally.
Clearly, a serious engagement between
theology and science necessitates sen-
sitive checking and cross-checking. It
is a hermeneutical engagement, not a
wholesale demythologization or "op-
erationalization" of theology for the
sake of science (the cultured cringe).
Churchland's claim that CSP has stagnated
for two to three thousand years might actu-
ally suggest the efficiency and accuracy of
CSP in judging what goes on in nature, such
that human beings have succeeded in dy-
namic engagement with changing environ-
ments for millennia.
//. A humble theological claim for the soul
William Seager recognizes the difficul-
ties of EM, and the unlikelihood of a com-
plete, reductive explanation of mind, since
the kind of information necessary to provide
such an explanation (explanations are "ac-
counts of phenomena that aim at truth and
which seek to make the phenomena intelli-
gible to their target audience") is unlikely to
be intelligible to any human being." Seager
suggests a realistic goal is resolution—cor-
relating different entities and theories about
them, without explicating physical causation
at every point.23 This concession, together
with the final criticism made of Churchland
above, raises a major preoccupation of this
essay, namely, what constitutes theological
humility? Theology, inasmuch as it responds
to its engendering religious situation, is an
articulation of the claims and the being-
claimed of a Christian life-world. Proper
theological humility would, thus, be com-
mitted to these various claims, even in ac-
knowledging imperfect understanding as to
the claims' performance. 24
Orthodox theologian, John Zizioulas,
insists that personhood is fundamental to
human being. ("Personhood" answers to
soul, psyche, in the present
context.) It is Zizioulas' fun-
damental term for describing
human being and the basis of
responsibility—it is not free-
dom in an unconditioned
sense ( freedom from biologi-
cal constitution, or "biologi-
cal hypostasis," as Zizioulas
puts it), but transcendence of
the biological situation in
such a way as to be respon-
sible for it ( the freedom of our
biological hypostasis). Personhood contrasts
with the horizon of "biological anonymity"
(my term) that helps validate EM: as Patricia
Smith Churchland indicates, EM succeeds,
in part because all neurons share a basic
structural homology. However, some ques-
tions might be asked, informed by Zizioulas'
study: If \ht prosopon merely masks real bio-
logical anonymity, then why do humans
"face" one another, "lose face," and so on?
What is the reason for the infinite nuance of
human relations? A serious account would
resist biological anonymity by recognizing
the powers of personhood.
Asserting the primacy of personhood is
not, for Zizioulas, a disavowal of our bio-
logical constitution, but a realization of its
proudest claim: that it is God's image. Si-
multaneously, to be human is to be so
claimed. In other words, that we think of
ourselves as persons is not obviously a bio-
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logical necessity, and to this extent it is a
free, decisive act; yet, neither is it obviously
a choice for which the "I" can take credit or
blame (hence, the religious intensity of de-
bates over abortion and euthanasia).
Zizioulas says that any assertion of
personhood admits of being claimed by
God. 25 Personhood should lead to a thankful-
ness, communion, orthodoxy, which mark a
transformation of the biological hypostasis:
The eternal survival of the person as
a unique, unrepeatable and free
"hypostasis," as loving and being
loved, constitutes the quintessence of
salvation, the bringing of the Gospel
to man. In the language of the
Fathers this is called "diviniza-tion"
(theosis), which means partici-pation
not in the nature or substance of
God, but in his personal existence. 26
This divinization realizes what Zizioulas will
call "ecclesial hypostasis."
However, the biological constitution of
the human being must be called "tragic," be-
cause it is not only a basis but a subversion
of the saveability of the person. As elimina-
tive materialists take for granted—and not
they alone—humans die. The tragedy is not
that we delude ourselves about our real (bio-
logical) nature, a la
Nietzschean resentment.
Rather, "it lies in (the hu-
man being's] tendency
toward becoming a per-
son through it and failing.
Sin is precisely this fail-
ure. And sin is the tragic
prerogative of the person
alone" 27 Zizioulas pre-
sents, then, an account of
the soul as emergent
from, and yet somehow
also preceding, the biological constitution of
human being. :s This echoes non-EM neu-
roscientific theories of the "emergence" or
" supervenience" of personal reality from
biological existence. It implies that one
ought not disavow the biological constitu-
tion of human being, but look for a kind of
"new birth" in which that biological hyposta-
sis is itself constituted through the "hyposta-
sis of ecclesial existence." 24
Clearly, Zizioulas would only refuse a
neurobiological account insofar as it takes
place outside of a horizon concerned with sal-
vation. That the horizon entails Christology
is evidence of its modesty, in my view: hu-
mans express humility first and foremost, in
attempting Christology (or Buddhology, or the
Tao of the sage, etc.), in owning the transcen-
dent virtue of a "perfected human":
Christology... is the proclamation to
man that his nature can be "assumed"
and hypostasized in a manner free
from the ontological necessity of his
biological hypostasis, which, as we
have seen, leads to the tragedy of
individualism and death. Thanks to
Christ man can henceforth himself
"subsist." can affirm his existence as
personal not on the basis of the
immutable laws of nature, but on the
basis ol' a relationship with God
which is identified with what Christ
in freedom and love possesses as
Son of God with the Father.30
Christology is both the proclamation to and
the proclamation of human being of its
ownmost possibility. It is thus, Christolog-
ically. that the peculiar reciprocity of the
Yet, both empirical science and Christian
faith have built-in resistances to the
possibility of completion. There will,
therefore, always be a degree of competi-
tion between the accounts while their
horizons differ; but they are not mutually
exclusive.
soul's emergence and preemergence can
make sense for Zizioulas. The soul's dig-
nity and humility coincide in the biological
constitution's Christological transcendence
into ecclesial hypostasis/ 1
Nevertheless, we do still die: the body
corrupts. Life in the Church does not prevent
this. Zizioulas acknowledges this and argues:
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[W|e really need a new ontological
category—not to destroy the distinc-
tion which I have made between
biological and ecclesial hypostasis,
but to express the relationship of
these two to each other. In fact the
encounter between the ecclesial and
the biological hypostases | perhaps the
paradigm for the present exploration]
creates a paradoxical relationship in
human existence. Man appears to
exist in his ecclesial identity not as
that which he is but as that which he
will be; the ecclesial identity is
linked with eschatology, that is, with
the final outcome of his existence. 32
As eschatological, the preemergence of the
soul might be described as "advenient" (a
counterpart to the neuroscientific theory of
supervenience alluded to above). Zizioulas
does not detail the exact character of the
eschatologically completed human being
—
for instance, with regard to the "eternal sur-
vival of the person," whether it is "subjec-
tive" or "objective" immortality, to use terms
that process theologians have long employed.
The intelligibility of objective participation
in life is a preliminary question of no little
note in regard to Orthodox theology. But it
should also be observed that Zizioulas does
not speak of the biological hypostasis in its
ecclesial, eschatological transformation as
un-dying, but as transcending death. 33
Conclusion
What can a theologian learn from this
test case in constructing an integrative
psyche-logy? This has been an unusual ex-
change, in that much care has been exerted
to qualify theological credulity for neurosci-
entific findings. The point has been not so
much to limit theological assertion as to un-
derstand limit conditions for the encounter
of theology and neuroscience. Prime among
them must be the genuine humility of frank
interestedness in the inquiry. Other limit
conditions have also been at least somewhat
clarified, and two are noted here. First, the
study of Zizioulas has hardly refuted EM
(and EM would direct pointed questions to
Zizioulas). However, it does challenge
eliminative materialists to complete neuro-
science—if they can—before the completion
of human personhood takes place and the
Church triumphs—if it does. Both these
completions are "eschatological" in their
way. Yet, both empirical science and Chris-
tian faith have built-in resistances to the pos-
sibility of completion. There will, therefore,
always be a degree of competition between
the accounts while their horizons differ; but
they are not mutually exclusive. Each owes
humility to the other. In addition, a core
problem must be recognized before a seri-
ous encounter can occur, namely, to describe
the relationship, if any, between emergence
and preemergence, supervenience and
advenience. It is still not clear that there is a
way to reduce the different trajectories these
concepts plot for the relation of soul and
body to a final account; but the viability of a
resolution involving Christological interest
has been maintained by attending to
Zizioulas' theological construal of biologi-
cal constitution as fundamentally personable
and, so, basic to human responsibility. These
conditions, then, supply a modest proposal
for a genuinely humble exchange between
theological and neuroscientific inquiry.
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Endnotes:
1. Some might question the absence
from this essay of a concerted critique of
EM as dogmatically reductionistic. That
critique is warranted. However, in this
essay, I prefer to recognize the ambitions
of eliminative materialists, like the
Churchlands. at face value, for the sake of
elucidating "limit conditions" for a
mutually uncompromising encounter
between theology and neuroscience. Let
compromise (and/or correction) be a
possible outcome, not a precondition, of
the encounter.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, by
"theology" and "theologian" I mean a
discipline and a practitioner within
Christianity.
3. Richardson, p. 351.
4. Keck addresses this possibility and,
through it. conditions for the contempo-
rary possibility of the question concerning
salvation.
5. On the other hand, more than once
neuroscience and related scientific/tech-
nological developments have prompted
controversies about the integrity of being
with well-being in the person. "Surgical"
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operations on the brain, ranging from the
famous accident of the railroad foreman
Phineas Gage, to frontal lobotomy, demon-
strated that a person's public identity and
well-being somehow is implicated with the
physical condition of the brain. Gage
(1823-1860) survived an accident in which
a tamping iron more than a meter long and
weighing six kilograms was shot com-
pletely through his skull and cerebrum,
although he was "no longer Gage"
according to John Harlow, a doctor who
attended Gage over several years. See
Finger, pp. 272-273. More recently, the
antidepressant, Prozac, has occasioned
public controversy over just what kind of
"medical miracles" we will tolerate and
which should be left to God. See Kramer.
6. By poetic indirection I mean princi-
pally that myth invokes a person's or
community's active participation for the
realization (poiesis) of its reference
structure. Myth is "merely myth," in the
pejorative sense, when mythic conscious-
ness dies. Two theologians dealing with
comparable notions are Hart and Oliver.
7. A further implication, important for
this essay, of the idea of poetic indirection
is that there is, after all, a sense in which
religion invents the soul. If theology is
completely at the behest of religious life
then practitioners of other kinds of inquiry
would have grounds to dismiss it alto-
gether. However, insofar as theology is
autonomous with respect to religious
interests, it has a comparable standing with
other disciplines. Thus, if theologians find
reasons for the plausibility of the soul, it is
at least possible that inquirers in other
disciplines may do the same.
8. Theologians have then gone various
ways, more or less consonant with the
mythic presentation. The doctrine of
double predestination and the Social
Gospel, for instance, are very different
interpretations, each with serious disso-
nances.
9. Cf. Richardson, p .352, where he
states that the first of the core theological
beliefs with regard to human being is that
the Creator desires a relationship with
finite creatures that entails reciprocity and
responsibility: "The divine-human rela-
tionship is a moral relationship, involving
promises, obligations and goods to be
pursued." Also cf. Barbour, pp. 360-61:
"The Old Testament sees man as rooted in
nature, sharing the finitude, creatureliness
and death of all living things.... Man and
beasts are equally perishable. Yet man is
distinguished from this animal world by
his special relationship to God. Man alone
is a responsible self who can be addressed
by God. Man, as a free purposeful agent
who can respond to the demands of
righteousness and justice, is made "in the
image of God." Man's 'breath' or 'spirit' is
not a separate entity but the animating
principle of the total person, the vitality of
the whole individual in his biological,
mental, and emotional life."
10. See Flanagan, p. 1. He writes: "In
1663, thirteen years after his death, all of
Descartes' works were put on the Index of
the Roman Catholic Church, even though
his writings contained two proofs for the
existence of God as well as arguments for
the incorporeality and immortality of the
human soul. Descartes was a threat
because he took the science of his day so
seriously that he considered extending
Galileo's mechanical conception of the
physical universe to human behavior."
See Robinson, p. 197, where he interprets
modernity as a broader rejection of a
Renaissance worldview, "the triumph of
naturalism over spiritualism." Also see
Zilboorg, p. 180, where he, too, identifies
a sixteenth/seventeenth century shift away
from "metaphysics," foreshadowing "the
coupling of psychology with physics; the
words anima and spiritus, so monoto-
nously popular theretofore, began to be
supplanted...." Marx's critique, more
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subtle than his slogans sometimes sound,
makes the point plain: "Religion is the sigh
of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of
a heartless world, the soul of soulless
conditions [emphasis added). It is the
opium of the people." See Marx, pp. 43-4.
11. P. M. Churchland. p. 67.
12. Is this slipping the soul back in
through the back door of Latin? The move
is slightly more subtle; it is a suggestion
that the kind of phenomena prompting any
psychology appear to be not merely
mechanical effects of the position of some
kind of on-off switch. The most basic
question asked by all psychologies, then
(and by an integrative psyche-logy), is
whether the appearance is true to reality.
13. Seager identifies five physicalist
approaches. In descending order of
sympathy for CSP they are: type-identity
theory, psycho-functionalism, token-
identity theory, psychological instrumen-
talism and eliminative materialism. Cf.
Seager. Part 1
.
14. P. M. Churchland, pp. 72-3.
15. Ibid., pp. 73-4.
16. Ibid., p. 75. Churchland 's seemingly
unreflected allusion to CSP's "own
domain" is a noteworthy concession. The
idea of a domain suits this essay's termi-
nology of horizons and resolutions.
17. Smith Churchland. p. 36.
18. Searle. p. 56.
19. Ibid., p. 59. On this point, it seems
to me that Richardson presents CSP in a
more "theoretical*' way than Searle thinks
is realistic. I have tried to steer a path
between, by reducing the stipulative
claims of a theological commitment to
"human being is responsible being."
20. Ibid. pp. 27-8.
21. P.M. Churchland, p. 85.
22. Seager, p. 18. Note that Seager
eschews the Churchlands' zeal for
"supersessionist" language in describing
the aoal of EM.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. I take this to be a crucial attitude for
a theology that regards human beings as
such, irrespective of their particular
religious commitments. Such is the
evangelical genius of Orthodox theology,
as discussion to follow may indicate; I also
connect this approach with the example of
Valerie Saiving in her now-classic feminist
theological consideration of the human
situation. See Saiving. pp. 37-9.
25. See n. 6.
26. Zizioulas, pp. 49-50.
27. Ibid., p. 52.
28. On emergence as an explanation of
personhood within neurobiological theory,
see Cole, pp. 343-50: Richardson.
29. Zizioulas. p. 53.
30. Ibid., p. 56.
31. The Chinese tradition has been on
the whole more able to image the self-
sameness of human dignity and humility
than have many strands of Christian
tradition. For example, the Xunzi, 19.6.
reads: "Heaven is able to beget the myriad
things, but it cannot differentiate them.
Earth can support man. but it cannot
govern him. The myriad things under the
canopy of heaven and all those who
belong among living people depend upon
the appearance of the sage, for only then is
each assigned to the proper station." See
Xunzi. p. 67. See also Ivanhoe.
32. Zizioulas, p. 59.
33. Ibid., pp. 64-5.
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